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The higher the real income of a society, the greater
the weight that the society as a whole is likely to put
on the nonmonetary side of occupational choice. The
president of an American university remarked not long
ago that as real income continues to rise we may well
see the day when a garbage collector is paid more than
a full professor"
W. Boweri [5,P. 19]
Despite its simple and static nature, conventional leisure income analysis
seems to be useful in the interpretation of long-run trends in labor supply.
Thus, the shortening of the working week is explained by a dominant incoma effect
in the demand for leisure (see Lewis [11]). The emphasis of this approach is on
the quantity of work while the quality of work is often neglected. The purpose
of this paper is to indicate similar regularities in the area of occupational
choice.
A simple one-period model is used to examine the effect of changes in
nonhuman and human wealth on the choice of an occupation. Just as in usual
income-leisure analysis we have two alternative interpretations of the one-period
model in mind. One is the allocation of time in the short run among work activities
within an occupation and for a given level of skill. A switch from one such job to
another is assumed to have a negligible effect on future earnings opportunities.
Another interpretation is based upon viewing a whole lifetime as a single period.
In this approach the relevant wages are permanent," that is, proportional to
present value of lifetime earnings.
The results of the paper are summarized in five simple propositions on
the wealth effects under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. It is argued
that under certainty: An increase in nonwage income will increase the propensity
to choose pleasant low paying work activities. An increase in human capital, which—2—
we define to be a uniform proportional increase in wage earnings capacity, will
also induce a choice of pleasant work activities if the income effect is dominant.
Under conditions of uncertainty an increase in nonwage income will tend to
encourage the choice of risky high-paying work activities if their monetary returns
are uncertain. If the rionmonetary returns of an occupation are uncertain the
propensity to choose it will tend to decrease with wealth. Finally, an increase
in human capital is likely to discourage the choice of occupations with risky
monetary returns.
None of the above propositions is particularly novel or surprising.-' It
is hoped however that bringing them under a unified treatment will be useful.
The understanding of the income effect may be helpful in explaining long
run and short run changes in labor supply and the corresponding changes in wage
differentials. Furthermore, since wage earnings are endogenous within the model
it is natural to inquire into the (reduced) relation between rionwage and wage
earnings. Clearly, if wealthy individuals also earn higher monetary returns on
their human capital, then, other things being equal, the distribution of trans-
ferable wealth becomes less equal as time passes and generations evolve. The
reverse may be true if originally wealthy individuals prefer jobs in which
relatively low monetary returns are expected. It will be shown that the relation
between wage and nonwage income is likely to be of a different sign under conditions
of certainty and uncertainty.
The Model Ut'1er Certainty
Consider an individual who allocates a given amount of time among m time
activities. Let t.bethe portion of the period spent at activity i and let
w. be the real wage per period in activity i .Inthis section we assume that
wages are known with certainty. We assume that activity m is a leisure activity—3—
with W =0,allother activities are work activities and offer a positive wage.
The amount of time spent on consumption activities is assumed to be predetermined.
Throughout the discussion we shall assume that prices of goods are given and
known with certainty. All goods can therefore be aggregated into a single com-
posite commodity ("consumption") which we shall denote by x The price of
x will be set at 1.
We restrict the discussion to a one-period model in which savings are
taken to be predetermined. The budget constraint assumes the form
m
1.x=A+ t.w. i=l 1 1
where the period's real nonwage earnings are denoted by A
Jobs are of different quality and the amounts of time spent at different
jobs are treated as different commodities. The individual's preferences with
respect to the various consumptions and allocations of time are represented by
an ordinal utility function:
2. u =u(x,t,t .. t) 1 2 m
It is essential for our analysis that an unambiguous common ranking of
occupations exist in terms of their "pleasantness." For this purpose we shall
assume that preferences are identical across individuals. Furthermore, we
require that the ranking is independent of the market wage structure. A
necessary condition is that utility will be separable and an aggregate ii(t1.. tm)
exist such that:
3. u =u(x,n(t1, t2..t)).-4-
Further restrictions depend on the "degrees of freedom"which we allow
in the allocation of time. Through most of theanalysis we shall assume that
individuals can choose only one workactivity, and that the amount of work in
each job is fixed. Let us denote by n.the level of n when t.
t =1-t°,andthe rate of work in all other activities isput at a zero m
level. We shall say that job 1ismore pleasant than jif > 0and
n. > n. .Thenumbers n1,n2 ..nmay be interpreted as the nonmonetary
returns associated with the various time activities.We may thus distinguish
jobs in terms of their, exogenously given,norimonetary returns as well as on the
basis of the wage rate which they offer. Theoperational meaning of the above
definition is quite clear. Job i ismore pleasant than j if when the wages
(and thus consumptions) of the two job are setequal, then job i is chosen.
Due to the separability assumption this choice isinvariant with the level at
which the two wages are set equal. Wemay thus assign numbers n,r12 ...n
and an appropriate utility index torepresent this ranking. The choice of these
indices must, however,satisfy one further restriction. The rate of substi-
tution between the monetary andnonmonetary returns of any two jobs must be
invariant under all admissable transformationson n( ) and u( ).Operationally,
this rate of substitution is revealed by thewage compensation which is required
for unpleasant work.
It should be emphasized that in thepresent analysis nonmonetary returns
are viewed as an ordinal index which is associated with thealternative occupa-
tions. This reflects our distinction between thequality and quantity of work.
In some cases it is, of course, possible to ascribedifferences in nonmonetary
returns to differences in measurable (up to a linearor a ratio scale) "objective"
quantities, such as, hours of work, or temperature and levelof noise at the
place of work. In general however, it is notoperationally feasible to produce—5—
objective and separate measures of factors such as effect on health, effort,
repetitiveness, challenge, and other working conditions which are known to be
"relevant." We therefore restrict the discussion topropositions which do not
depend on the assumption of measurable characteristics of jobs.-"
Consider any two jobs i andj such that job iis more pleasant.
4/ It is clear that for anyone to choose occupation
jwemust have w > w,
However, not all individuals require the same compensation. Since by assumption
tastes are identical the only source of variation lies in the presumed unequal
distribution of wealth.
Let q.. denote the compensating wage change (in job 1) which will induce
indifference between the two jobs. That is q.. is definedas the solution of-1
4. u(A +w.,n.) =u(A+w.+q..,n.) 1 1 •3 1] J
Clearly, q.. depends on w1, w, n, n and A. The testable properties of this
function depend upon the restrictions imposed on the utility function. Inpartic-
ular it can be showrr' (See Rosen [16J) that:
Proposition 1.If nonmonetary returns are viewed as a "normal good"
u -\ (i.e. a n . . c'q. (j—) > 0) then n > n implies 1]>0. x
Wealthier individuals will require a higher wage compensation forunpleasant work.
Note that the assumed normality of nonmrnetary return is invariant under
monotone transformation on n .-
Ifnonhuman wealth is the only source of ariation across individuals then
it follows from proposition 1 that there exists a unique level ofnonwage income
A', such that every one with a higher income will prefer the pleasantlow-paying
job i to the unpleasant high-paying one, I .Allindividuals with lower
nonwage income will prefer the high-paying unpleasant job.-6—
The analysis can be extended to cover individual differences in human
wealth. In the present context we may identify human capital with general earning
capacity. An increase in human capital is assumed to be equivalent to a uniform
proportional increase in the earning capacity in all jobs. (An increase by the
same absolute magnitude is, of course, equivalent to an increase in nonhuman
wealth).
A proprotional wage increase involves a price effect. If the individual
is to switch from job i to j he will gain more in terms of consumption for
the same loss in nonmonetary returns. Due to the opposing income and substitution
effects' the net result isambiguous. As in standard leisure-income analysis
we may tentatively assume that the income effect is dominant.
It may be argued that an increase in human capital opens new opportunities
for more pleasant work activities. In other words nonmonetary returns are also
likely to increase with variables such as ability and schooling which are summa-
rized in the human capital concept. This leads to a more complicated analysis
which we shall not pursue.
The choice of leisure in each job can also be incorporated in the analysis.
Let n.(t) denote the value of n when the individual works at the rate t in
occupation i (i.e. t. =ttm =l-tand t. =0for ji, m). In the present
context we shall say that job I is more pleasant then jif n.(t) > n.(t) for
1 > t > 0. Again, a higher wage must be paid to induce any individual to work at
the unpleasant work. To see this note that if w =w.,theindividual can
1 3
always "buy" the optimal (x, t') while working in job i and thus be better off.
Consider any two jobs i andj such that i is more pleasant (i.e.
n.(t) > n.(t)). Define a compensating wage differential by
5. u(x.(A,w.), n.(t.(A,w.))) =u(x.(A,w.+q..),n.(t.(A,w.+q..)))—7—
Note that (x,, t.) and (x., t.) are now subject to choice, hence the appearance
of their demand function in 5. Theeffects of changes in nonwage income on the
choices within each occupation and on the propensity to switch jobs are summarized
in proposition 2.
Proposition 2If work satisfaction is a normal good (i.e. > 0) and if
the relatively pleasant work activities are normal inputs in the 'roductio& of
n work satisfaction (i.e n.(t) > n.(t) and n.(t.)n.(t.) imply i i 1 3 i 1 3 3 r
9/ i 3
then n.(t) > n.(t) implies q1
o
—, i
The definition of normal "inputs" requires further explanation. Consider
the sub-problem of maximizing x for a given level of n (i.e. n.(t.) =n.(t.)=n)
Clearly job i will be chosen depending upon whether w. n.1(n) w.n.'(n).
By normality in the context of exclusive alternatives, we mean that as n
increases, wages remaining the same, the propensity to choose the pleasant work
activity increases. Formally, this is equivalent to the requirement which appears
in proposition 2.
As in the fixed leisure case for any given wages w, w. there is a
critical level of nonwage income A' such that every individual with a lower
wealth will prefer the relatively unpleasant high paying job, Consider an
individual with A < A' .Ashis wealth increases wages remaining the same he
will purchase more work satisfaction that is more n.Initiallythis is achieved
by reducing the number of hours at the job at which he currently works. Eventually,
however, as A increases above A' more work satisfaction is achieved by switching
to a more pleasant low paying job. It is quite possible that upon switching he
will decide to work more hours)" Such a pattern may in fact be observed over
some phases of theindividual'slife cycle. A similar observation mayapplyto
across section. Wea-!iy individuals will tend to work atmore pleasant work-8-
activities and earn less, but they may work longer hours. It is ofcourse, not
surprising that such "anomolies" my exist in the relation between hours of
work and income. The reason is that in thepresent analysis hours of work are
not homogenous.
If one is willing as a first approximation to ignore theeffects of risk
then the following rather obvious implications follow.Over time the exogenous
increases in nonhuman wealth and in productivity will tendto increase the (real)
absolute wage differentials between pleasant andunpleasant jobs or occupations
rema in
Provided, of course, that demand conditions /roughly the same. In jobs or
occupations which are both unpleasant and "nonprogressive" (i.e. have slowrate
of technological advance, see Baumol [3J) considerablewage hikes will be necessary
to attract labor. Thus, we expect garbage collectors,plumbers, construction
workers, police and firemen to be paid an increasingly higher absolute realwage
compensation as time passes. If due to budgetary constraints or moral codes there
is a fixed or slowly adjusting upper bound on realwages in these low status jobs,
shortages will develop.Of course, the quality of jobs need not be a datum.
Employers may substitute investment in improving working conditions forwage
hikes. We shall, therefore, expect some decrease in thequality differences
among jobs as productivity and nonhuman wealth increase.
Similar implications may be tested across countriesor states. The often
mentioned shortage of domestic servants, waiters,nurses, plumbers, construction
workers, etc. in advanced economies may be ascribed to an income effect which
12/ reduced the supply of these presumably unpleasantor socially inferior occupations.—
The implications regarding the distribution of transferable wealthare less
clear. The reason is that human wealth is not independent from theinitial stock
of nonhuman wealth. Mainly due to imperfections in thecapital market we expect-9-
that individuals with more inherited wealth will also acquire a higher stock of
human capital. At the same time, due to the assumption that wealthy individuals
have a higher propensity to forego monetary returns in favor of more pleasant
work activities, we expect them to have lower monetary return on their human
capital. The net effect on earnings is therefore ambiguous.
The Effects of Risk
The analysis of the previous section was seen to yield some plausible
implications of broad scope. Admittedly, many important aspects of the occupa-
tional choice problem such as life cycle patterns were neglected or "maximized
out" of the problem. Our decision to single out the effects of risk for further
discussion is not necessarily a reflection of a taste for complicated analysis with
ambiguous results. Our purpose is to point out some observable regular wealth-
type of job patterns. Indeed, there are well known postulates due to Arrow
fl, Ch. 3J which hypothesize a systematic relation between wealth and attitudes
towards risk.
Let there be S states of the world. Each state is a specification of
the wages and the other characteristics in every job. Adopting the expected
utility hypothesis the maximization problem assumes the following form:
6. mx pu(x,n)
t ,t .. t seS
SS S 12m m
s.tx =w.t.+A 1=1 is 1
n=n(t ,t ..t) ssI 2 in
m 1= ,t.>O .
1=11 1
Tosimplify the analysis, we assume that leisure is fixed and that the
individual can work in only one job. Specifically, let t =0and t. =0,1—10—
for i =1,2 ..rn-i.Let n .bethe value of n when the individual works Si
at job i and state soccurs. Thus each occupation may be viewed as a two
dimensional lottery ticket offering a joint distribution ofmonetary and non-
monetary returns. Note the dual role which is now played by the index of non-
monetary returns' Given the same wages it provides an ordering over states of the
world as well as over occupations.
In dealing with risky occupations or work activities one should be careful
to distinguish the monetary and nonmonetary aspects. We shallsay that only
monetary returns are risky if when the individual works at job 1, w•varies
with s while n. is independent of the state of the world (i.e. n. =n.). is is i
Such may be the case of a prospective lawyer for instance. We shallsay that
only the nonmonetary returns are risky if w.is independent of the state of
the world (i.e. w. =w.)but the function n.is not. Such may be the case is i is
of a professional soldier with a guaranteedwage. His utility from the same
amount of earnings will depend upon whether he is healthy or injured, a combat
hero or an uriknown.--' His distinction and level of healthdepend, of course,
on the (unknown) state of the world.
For the sake of simplicity we restrict the analysis to comparisons between
a risky occupation and a nonrisky one. Furthermore we deal only with extreme
(and unrealistic) situations in which the variance is located at onlyone type
of return, and deal separately with the case of uncertainmonetary returns and
uncertain nonmorietary ones. We assume that risk aversion is predominant.
Consider, first, the case in which only monetary returns in say job i
are uncertain and let there be another job, say j
,inwhich returns (both
monetary and nonmonetary) are certain. As before let us define a compensating
wage differential q.. ,whichwould iuakethe twojobs equivalent. The appro-
priate compensation isdefinedby:—11—
7. E {u(A + .,n.)}=u(A+ w. + q. .,n.) 1 1 3 13 3
(Weuse on top ofvariable to indicate randomness)
We first examine the effect of an increase in nonhuman wealthon the reauired
compensation. There are now two forces at work. One is the presumed normality
of pleasant work activities, the second is decreasing absolute risk aversion.
Combining these two aspects we have the following proposition.it"
Proposition 3If n is a normal good, and if absolute risk aversion for
monetary returns is decreasing (—(--—u) <0) then n1 > n implies that
q.
A special case is in which the two occupations are equally pleasant n1 fl,.
It is then seen that increase in nonhuman wealth increases the propensity to
choose the more risky (in the monetary sense) occupation. Since n. =n.also
implies that the risky job pays a higher expected wage we get an empirical impli-
cation which is in sharp contrast to the results of the previous section. As
nonhuman wealth increases the (expected) monetary returns from human capital tend
to increase.
The above special case should serve as a sufficient warning against the
merging of variability in return with other undesirable attributes. While there
is similarity in that both command a compensating wage differential, there is a
difference in the direction of the income effect. It is well known for instance
that the government and educational institutions pay lower salaries (for the same
level of schooling) than private industry. If one interprets this differa-ice
mainly as a (negative) compensation for the presumably more pleasant academic
life, then onewouldexpect that wealthy ir1i ,iduals would be more likely to accept
jobs in universities nrinthe gov.ernment and toforegothe monetary advantage-12-
associated with private industry. (see Freeman 17, p. 4]). On the other hand
it is also known that private industry is more risky in itsmonetary returns
(see Weiss 122]). If one interprets the observed higher mean earning inprivate
industry mainly as compensation for risk, then one would predict that the
relatively wealthy be more likely to take on jobs in private industry. clearly,
taking into account both possibilities leads to the conclusion that the effect
of family wealth on such choices is not easily predictable.
The notion that more wealthy individuals are, other things beingequal,
more inclined to prefer risky work activities is, at first glance, in variance
with casual experience. Is it not the case, for instance, thatmore wealthy
individuals are less inclined to become professional soldiers, policemen,firemen,
mine workers, etc. than poor individuals with comparable ability and skills?
Here is where our distinction between monetary and normonetary riskscomes in.
If risk is concentrated in the nonmonetary aspects of a job then underfairly
plausible conditions increase in nonhuman wealth will diminish the propensity to
choose it.
Consider, then, a case, in which only the nonmonetary returns of jobi
are uncertain. While, as before, the monetary and nonmonetary returns of the
alternative job j are certain.
Let us define q.along the same lines as before. Let n be the
1_i 1
certainty equivalent level of nonmonetary returns in job i .Thatis,
8. E {u(A + w., ?.)} =u(A+ w, n) 11 1 1
We shall say that job i is(locally)more pleasant than j if n >n. .It
is now possible to prove the following proposition.-'l3-
Proposition 4If n is a normal good and if the aversion tononmonetary risks
qi. is nondecreasing with A(i.e.
(- >0)then n < n. implies < 0.
In other words, wealthier individuals will require a lowerwage compensation
in order to switch to the less risky and more pleasantjob.
As seen proposition 4 depends on the nature of risk dependence (seeKeeny
[8]). The assumption made is that increase in monetary wealth reduces thepropen-
sity to take nonmonetary bets of a given size. For instance a wealthy individual
with higher consumption potential will be more averse touncertainty of future
health, the reason being, essentially, that more is put at stake. Insome cases,
of course, risk independence is more reasonable.Teaching for instance involves
uncertain nonmonetary returns in terms of respect of students and the like butthe
variance in the utility of income in teaching is not likely todepend upon the level
of income. Note that the direction of risk dependence,i.e., the sign of—
( -—)is invariant under the choice of index fornonmonetary returns.—
The apparent puzzle is thus resolvedupon noting two different meanings of
Uriskinestt In comon usuage risk is most frequently associated withthe danger
of injury, rather than with earning variability. Aswe have just seen such
occupations are likely to be inferior goods. Casual evidence seems to be consis-
tent with this result)i"
The analysis may be extended to cover the effects of changes in human
capital. Let the monetary returns of some job, say i,beuncertain, and compare
it with another job, say j,withcertain returns. Suppose again that changes in
human capital are equated with a uniform equi-proportional increase inearning
capacity in all occupations and all states of the world. The effects of such an
increase depend on the behavior of the parti'i dgree of risk aversion(see
Menezesand 1!ans3ii [14J andI)i;irnond and tigJitz 16]) .Tfwe acceptL1e second-14-
postulate of Arrow [1, Ch. 3] namely increasing relative risk aversion then partial
risk aversion will also increase. If the two occupations are equally pleasant
an
then/increase in human capital will induce a shift towards the unriskyoccupation.
If the two occupations are not equally pleasant then it is necessary to combine
attitudes towards risk with attitudes towards monetary and nonmonetary returns.
The following proposition can be derived)-"
Proposition 5.If the partial degree of risk aversion towards monetary returns
wu
is increasing ( ) >0 for w ÷ A) and if the income effect is
dominant for choices under certainty, then n. < n. implies < 0. That is if
the unrisky occupation is also more pleasant individuals with high earning capacity
will be more inclined to choose it.
Notice that for the special case n. =n•there is a contrast between the
1 3
effect of human and nonhuman capital. While inherited family wealth increases
the propensity to choose the risky (and on the average high paying) occupation,
native abilities or acquired human wealth diminishes it. This reflects •the built-
in assumption that increase in human capital increases the variance of earnings
while increase in A does not.
An interesting empirical question is whether individuals do in fact obey
the two Arrow postulates. Decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing
relative risk aversion are after all empirical hypotheses which may be falsified.
In the case of portfolio choice casual observation and empirical evidence are
consistent with the above postulates. In the case of occupational choice it is
difficult to eliminate the nonmonetary effects which as we have seen influence
the nature of the testable implications of the two hypothesis. Casual evidence
is therefore not so closely at hand.-_V Some attention should also be given to
interdependences of individual utilisies in the context of risk bearing. While—15—
each person in isolation may be risk averse, the desire to p.rove oneself as a
superior individual may lead to a behavior which would appear to imply risk
preference.
Multiple Job Holdings and Divisible Careers
The analysis so far assumed that during the period under discussion the
individual specializes in one job. For most purposes this is a reasonable assump-
tion. The cause for specialization lies in the accumulation of specific work
experience which imposes high (and increasing with age) costs on occupational
mobility (see Weiss [23]. However, both in the short run, and in a lifetime context
individuals may combine work activities. A nurse may divide a period between day
shifts and night shifts, a sailor may divide a lifetime between work on sea and
some other occupation on the shore; similar cases would include professional
pilots, athletes or soldiers. Finally a physician may divide his life between
salaried and independent employment.
At the price of some gross oversimplifications-' such career and lob
patterns may be analyzed within a one-period model. Suppose that only two jobs
are considered, and that the amount of leisure is fixed. We may define job 1
as being more pleasant than 2 if t1 =t2implies that >2
that is,
if, when time is equally divided between the two jobs, then a transfer of a unit
of time from job 2 to 1 will increase utility. Given the same demand conditions
it follows from this definition that in market equilibrium
w1 < w2
The comparative static analysis may now be carried out in terms of
t1
and t2 the proportions of the period spent at jobs 1 and 2 respectively. The
results are essentially the same as in the previous sections and will not be
repeated here.---' There is however one new aspect of the analysis which is of a
Sconsiderableempirical importance which 1 wish to point out.—16—
Due to a negative income effect the short run supply of labor into
unpleasant work activities is likely to be wage inelastic and in extremecases
even backward bending. An increase in the pay for night shifts for,say, nurses
who are free to choose the desired combination of day andnight shifts may
encourage them to increase the share of shifts. To take another example,
it has been noted that despite very substantial rates ofreturns for maritime
schooling, the number of applicants is low and decreasing." Furthermorewage
hikes tend to shorten the proportion of life spent at sea. In suchcircumstances
employers may find it cheaper to invest in improved working conditions instead of
wage hikes. In the case of sailors, for instance, money is spent in an attempt
to facilitate the joining of wife and children to shorten the duration oftrips,
and to lengthen the periods on shore.
Cônc lus ions
The analysis of this paper suggests that unpleasant and pleasant jobs may
be classified according to two related criteria: (1) Higher wage is paid (in
equilibrium) for unpleasant work (2) The supply elasticity with respect to wealth
is negative for unpleasant jobs. More generally it is suggested that it is possible
to identify a fairly stable pattern of income (wealth) elasticities for occupations.
The estimation of these elasticities should prove useful for prediction purposes.—17—
FOOTNOTES
1. That increase in wealth is likely to induce a shift towards
pleasant low—paying work activities had been noted by Reder [17],
Rapping [18], Freeman [71 and Rosen [16]. Analysis of the income
effect on the choice of career under uncertainty is contained in
King [9] and in Diamond and Stiglitz [6]. None of the above references,
however, attempt to combine attitudes towards noumonetary advantages
with attitudes towards risk.
2. See Lucas [13], Ch. 4,6.
3. In terms of Lancaster's [10, pp. 18—19] framework we assume univer-
sality but not objectivity.
4.To simplify the notation and without loss of generality weassume,
unless otherwise specified, thatt =1and t1 =0for ij if the
individual works in job i.
5. One may consider alternative definitions ofq. For instance:
4' u(A + w•, n.) =u(A+ w. + n.)
Clearly such alternations have no effect in the results. The
definition in the text is preferred since it makes explicit the fact
that the individual takes wages as data.
6. Suppose that at the original situatio' the level of utility is given by
u(A° +w.,,n.) =u(A°+ w +q?.,n.) =u°
Define n(x) as the solution of u(x, n) =u0 .Bythe assumption of
normality:
I
d U —u(x, n(x)) =u —u_< 0 dx x xx nx
n-18—
0 Also by assumption n > n and thus w• < w + q
i j i j
It follows that:
aq..
=u(A0+ w, n(A0 + wi)) —u(A0+ w +q?.,n(A0 + w. +
>0
u(A0 +w.+ q., n(A0 +w+ q))
The proof can be established geometrically in an (n, x) space, noting
that due to normality the vertical distance between successive indif-
ference curves is increasing with x.
7.Let the original utility function be given by u(x,n) and the trans-
formed one by V(X,fl). By assumption i= h(n)with ht (n) > 0. Since
u( )isunique up to a positive monotone transformation we must have
v(x, h(n)) E F[u(x,n)] with F'(u) > 0
1 Thus v_ F (u) u -—, n nh(n)
and v=F'(u)u x x
It follows that (_!1) = — (.._a) ax v h(n) ax u
8.Let u(A + Hw, n.) =u(A+Hw +q1.,n,) where w denote wages of
an individual with a standard unit of skill (H =1).The measure of
human capital is H. Solving for the effect of change in H we obtain
w u (A+H, n.) — u
(A÷Hw?+qj., n)
u (A+Hw?+q. .,n.) x j 13 3
0____ 0 =w• + w.-w 1A 1 j
aq.
Assuming n. > n. then under normality the income effect w -
ispositive. But the substitution effect w —w
is negative.—19—
9.To simplify the proof assume that u(x,n) is quasiconcave and
that n(t.) <0,n(ti)
<0for all i. By the familiar envelope
q.
relation the sign of depends just as in the fixed leisure case
on the difference in the marginal utility of consumption in the two jobs.
(We assume that an interior solution is attained with 0 <t1,t.<1).
Under the assumed normality of n it is sufficient to show that
n(t) >n(t)implies ni(t.) >n.(t.)and x. <x.where (t., x)
is optimal with respect to (A,w1) and (t., is optimal with
respect to (A, w. + .•). :1]
Recall that n.(t) >n.(t)implies that w <w+q.. .Suppose
x >x.It follows that t. >tand n.(t )<n.(t).Consider i J 1 j ii j j
the first order conditions for optimum at each occupation:
•\ Uxj,ni/n1t =—
u(x.,ni)
u (x ,ri.) n'.(t.) w +q =-'i J J
jiju(x,n.)
Under the hypothesis that x. >x.and n <n. is larger in 1 j ij ux
job i and therefore n(t1) >n(t.).Butthis is impossible
under the assumptions that n =
njimplies n(t.) <n'(t.)(normality)
and n(ti) <U.Thiscontradiction established the proof.
10. The following example may be instructive.
Let u(x,n) =xn .
1m12 Suppose that in the absence of any restdction n =—--t.
m—l i=l
+ (a.t.)/(l—t)sothat when the individual can work in only one job
1=1 m-20-
n.a.1/2t ,n=-.t<O and n= —1<0.
By definition job i is more pleasant than j if a >a..Note
that in this example pleasant work activities are normal, a. >a.
and n.(t) =n.(t.)imply that t>t.andthus n(t.) <n'.(t.).
For a suitable choice of the parameters it can be shown that upon
switching to the pleasant work activity the individual is going to
work more hours. For instance, let a1 = ,a2
= , w1
=
andw2 =8.It is easy to verify that at A =1the individual is
indifferent between the two jobs. The optimal levels of t1and
t2
arethen and respectively. At lower levels of wealth the
individual attains a higher level of utility at job 2, and the reverse
is true for levels of wealth above 1. The specific solutions for
q1. andt,t asfunctions of A are given in the graph below
j#)J I
11.Secular increase in the variance of real wages across occupations and
industries is reported by Becker [4, p. 54n] and Lewis [11, Table 29—3].
These results are consistent with our hypothesis. There are, however,
alternative explanations. See, for instance, Becker [4, pp. 52—54].
Note also, that if the pleasant jobs require high skills and thus pay—21—
more, our hypothesis implies a reduction in the variance in real wages.
This was noted by Reder [17, p. 2671. It is thus c[ear that an appro-
priate test of the hypothesis requires that the level of skill is held
constant. The 1950, 1960, 1970 U.S. Census data on earnings by schooling
and occupation (occupational characteristics) provide some illustrative
examples. For instance, plumbers', and brick masons' median annual
earnings exceed that of an average participant with a comparable median
years of schoolings. Over the period 1950-1970 these differences tend
to increase in real terms.In the case of brick-masons the increase in
relative pay is associated with decrease in employment indicating a supply
shift. In the case of plumbers there is some increase in employment.
12.It is worth noting that in both the over-time and cross-section discussion
the effect of the distribution of income on the supply and demand for labor
in the various occupations should be incorporated. It is argued by Robinson
[19] and Stigler [21, p. 6] that a more equal distribution of income will,
ceteris paribus, reduce both the supply and demand for domestic servants.
13. A similar distinction is a familiar one in the literature on the economics
of health. See Arrow [2]. Note, however, that in the framework of
occupational choice health becomes a partially controlled variable. In
this case 'health dependance' does not imply 'statedependance'.
14. The proof follows in the lines suggestad by Pratt [16]. Using condition




u(A+w.+q. .,n.) x jij J
Letus define a certainty equivalence wage w• such that
u(A+w, n.) =E{u(A+w.,n.)}
:i 1 11—22—
By assumption n. > n. and it follows from (7) that w < w. +q. 1 3 1 3 1]
Furthermore, under normality we have
u (A+w, n.) > u (A+w.+q. ,n.) X 1 1 X J13J
Itis therefore sufficient to show that
E {u (A+., n.)} > u (A+w*, n.) X 1 1 X 1 1
Define v(x) =u(x,n1) and t =v(A+w.),
so that A+w =v(t)
and A+w =v1fEt}] .
Dueto the assumption of decreasing bsolute. risk aversion v'[v'(t)]
is a convex function oft .Itfollows that
E {u(A+., n.) —u(A+w,ii.) =Ev'[v(t)]} -v'[v(E{t})]> 0
15.As before we define by
E {u(A+w., ii)} u(A+w.+q.,
flj)
where n. is now random and all other variables are known with 1









usingthedefinition of nin(8', and the assumptions that n<
andthat n is normal we obtain
u (A+w., n) -u(A+w.+q. ,n.)<0. x 11 X jijj
Itis therefore sufficient to show that
u (A+w., n) > E {u (A+w , x 11— XiI-23-
Lett=u(A+w.,ni) =v(n.)
sothat n. v(t) .Alsoby definition n =v'[Et}].
Therefore
u(A+wi, n) —E{u (A+w1,7)}
u(A+w.,v1[E {}])- Etu (A+wi, v()) >0




U U Notefinally that,xn—/nn n'U
—xu n n
so that the relevant conditions is nondecreasing risk aversion for
nonmonetary risk as nonhuman wealth increases. i.e., -— (— ) >0
16. Let u(x, n) be the original utility function and let v(x, ii)bethe
transformed one where n =h(n)with h'(n) >0.Underthe expected
utility hypothesis u(x, n) is unique up to a linear transforms so that





Dividing the second equation by the first one we get
U V— nn -nnh (n) +h(n)
uv— h'(n) n n—24—
The second term on the R.H.S. is independent of x. It follows that
'V\ I nn . Inn sign—t —sign axuj ax\Vn
17. Again the 1950, 1960, 1970 U.S. Census data on earnings by occupation
and level of schooling provides some illustrative examples. Firemen's
Policemen's and Blaster's and powdermen's median annual earnings exceed
that of the average participant with a comparable median years of schooling.
Over the period 1950—70 these differences have increased, in real terms,
considerably. It is worth noting that firemen and policemen report a
higher than average number of hours per year. If one adjust to this,
perhaps nominal, difference then policemen and firemen are paid less than
the average employee. The trend of increase in relative pay is, however,
uneffected by this adjustment. Again one must bear in mind the increase in
employment which occurred in these occupations.
18. Let q.. be defined by the following equality
E{u(A+H, n)} =u(A+Hw?+q..,n)
where w, which is random, and w denote the earning capacity of an
individual with a standard level of skill (H =1)and H is an index of
human capital. We thus have
q.. E{?u (A+H?, n.)} -wu(A+Hw?+q.., n.) iJ=ix 1 1x jij 1
311
u (A+Hw+q.., n.) x jijJ
Define a certainty equivalence wage w by
Eu(A + H, n)} =u(A+ Hw, n.).—25—
Byassumption n < n. We also assume a dominant income effect
for proportional wage changes under certainty, it follows that
w u (A+Hw, n)< w u (A+Hw + n.)
It is therefore sufficient to show that
E U (A+Hw0, n.)}< w u (A+Hw, n.) ix i 1ix 1 1.
Let t =u(A+Rw',n )= v(A+Hw?)
1 1
so that A + 11w? =v1(t)
and A + Hw =v1[E() I
Then
—'0 * *
E fw. u (A+Hw., n.) }- wu (A+Hw ,n.) 1X 11ix 1 i.
[E{(v1(t) - - (v1(E{t})-A)v'[v1(Et})]<0
if(v1(t)-.A) v'(v1(t) ]isconcave in t.
By taking the derivative with respect to t it is immediately seen
—l V'1 V'1 that concavity is assured if the function v (t),and-
aredecreasing. (See Meneses and Hansan [14]).-26—
19. A first systematic test was attempted by King (9] who reports a
significant positive correlation between family income and the
propensity to choose occupations with high earnings variability.
However, King's study ignores the "noise" which is introduced by
nonmonetary returns.
20. In particular we ignore issues associated with the ordering in
time of the various phases of an individual career. Clearly
in a world with a positive interest and learning by doing the
ordering in time "matters" (see Weiss [23]).
21. We shall sketch the prooffor the analogues of propositions 1
and 3.
Consider first the case of certainty. We assume that job 1 is
more pleasant and that w2 >w1.
The individual's maximization problem is of the
maxV(t1)
=u(A+ w2 + (w1—w2) t1, n(t1, 1 —t1)]
tl
interior optimum V'(t1) =0and v"(t)<0.We wish to show that
—> 0.It is sufficient to show that —= u(w -w) xxi 2
+
Uxn2
>o• Substitutingrrom the first order condition
we get, due to normality, that
U n n x. u(w -w) +u C—-—)= (w-w) Cu -—U) >0 xx 1 2nx t t 1 2xx unmc—27—
Consider next, the case in which w1 is random. We assume that
at the optimum t1 is locally more pleasant, that is >.
av' . f an an








Thus>E{—Iu(w1-w2)+U()]} x 1 2
Furthermore, the term in the square brackets on the R.H.S. is
first negative and then positive. Using the first order condi-
u
tion and the fact that —ismonotone increasing (due to
Ux
the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion) the R.H.S.
is seen to be positive.
22. A study on the ratesof return for investment in maritime schooling
in Israel [15] estimates the private rate of return at about 25
per cent. The study by Rapping (18] on the earnings of seamen
in the U.S. indicates a trend of an increase in their relative
pay.-28-
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